Philippine Senate Hearing: Position on draft ASEAN Charter
August 28, 2008
The context within which we are addressing the question of whether or not the draft ASEAN Charter must be ratified by the Philippines through the Senate in accordance with the proposed Charter’s mandate involves the following considerations: one, the organization is over four decades old, not exactly a spring chicken, forty one last 8 August 1967 to be exact. Two, the concept appears to be a subtle compromise to accommodate the West within the region under conditions of distrust and brinkmanship known as the Cold War.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born in the period of the Cold War between the United States and its allies and the Socialist bloc led by then Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), on the other.
Within this polarized threat-of-war situation was a growing nonaligned movement led by Nehru’s India and Indonesia’s Sukarno in South and Southeast Asia that adroitly rejected to become part of the two contending political blocs. National liberation movements were challenging colonial structures in Indochina, spilling their influence over the borders of Thailand and Malaysia. An anti-imperialist movement was challenging US military bases in the Philippines, which the late Ferdinand Marcos had to protect, contributing to, among other factors, the declaration of martial law. Young students of Europe and America were marching the streets to protest the American war in Vietnam.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) of the fifties had its entire slip showing as a U.S. security initiative to try and put America’s big foot on the regional bloc. It failed to convince the region that it had the region’s security and protection in mind. This was made more obvious by the bloody coup d’etat on Indonesia’s Sukarno, which was known as a CIA-initiated crackdown on the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) and its influence on the people and its government. There were regional initiatives such as ASA, MAPHILINDO, and ASPAC, but only MAPHILINDO involving Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia appeared indigenous to the region without Western influence. All three initiatives were of short duration. ASEAN seemed the happy compromise. I am told that the name ASEAN was hatched in the US State Department, but nonetheless, the organization was carefully dressed in non-ideological garb and underscored economic, rather than political and security relations. Despite the non-ideological posture, economic cooperation was underpinned by free market thinking with a vision to setting up an ASEAN free trade agreement at some futuredate to make ASEAN resources available purportedly for regional benefit against the pressures of non-regional economies. In more than forty years of organizational life, the absence of any formal structure such as a Charter with a human rights perspective must have been deliberate if ASEAN were to survive as a seemingly innocent and non-ideological instrument. Its governments were led by leaders who were either successful in using their military to shake off the shackles of colonial control or leaders whose military were sustained precisely because of continuing neo-colonial control. The Philippines is an example of the latter and the presence of the U.S. bases then expressed this type of outside control over its politics and security. Understandably, the elitist ASEAN members would be foolish to subject themselves to collective discipline guided by human rights and the rule of law.
The decision to finally come up with an ASEAN Charter as ASEAN tip-toes to middle age anxiety can only be a product of internal influence on its governments and external pressures from Cold War disintegration and political realignments. Internal pressure on the Philippines in particular is grounded by a Constitutional mandate that provides our recognition of international standards on human rights and the rule of law.We are a signatory to some 32 international conventional instruments, around 28 of which are ratified and an increasingnumber domesticated into enabling statutes. The Senate has not yet ratified around five, the Rome Statute included.
A robust and dynamic human rights movement sustains lobby work for the passage of more human rights legislation, all of which impact on the significance of an ASEAN Charter ratified on a perspective of human rights and international humanitarian law. In this regard, civil society instruments through people’s organizations, NGOs and the academic community have combined forces and resources to underscore the following salient points on the draft ASEAN Charter:
ASEAN’s Charter was premised on the basic principle that ASEAN must evolve from the loose, elite-oriented association of government leaders into a rules-based organization founded on human rights. The assumption therefore of such a pronouncement was that a serious scrutiny of policies that have succeeded in allowing ASEAN to evade controversial issues that violate the fundamental rights of its peoples would have to be made.
The preamble and the general principles of ASEAN that incorporate its past agreements and its compliance individually to the UN Charter, the principles of human rights, international law and international humanitarian law are a qualitative leap in collective understanding of its rationale for being. This becomes more significant under ASEAN’s commitment to transform itself from a state-centered instrument to a people-centered organization. Such transformation is laudable and can only be done if ASEAN, as it commits itself in its preamble and general declaration of principles and purposes in Chapter 1, provides for more specific mechanisms to ensure effective enforcement of policies and principles.
There are two of these policies that have, over the past forty years, succeeded in gelling the member states of diverse cultures together. These are the twin decision-making policies of consensus and noninterference.
While non-interference was a staunch policy necessary to ward off pressure from former “colonial masters”, the policy has later evolved as a convenient tool to evade accountability for abuse of authority by any of the member states. In this regard, ASEAN has been found to be wanting and weak-kneed in addressing the non-compliance of Burma to its commitments of democratization as a presumption to its acceptance as member of the ASEAN in 1997. In particular, the refusal of the Military Junta of Burma to respect the mandate of the Burmese people who elected their representatives in 1990 is a gross violation of democracy and the rule of law. Burma’s commitment as a new ASEAN member was to democratize its rule and work on the reconciliation of its diverse contending forces through a roadmap participated in by all stakeholders. This proved to be a failure as all elected members of Parliament including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were incarcerated. This led to the Saffron Revolution and massive student protests which were all met with brute force and violence. The Military Junta insisted on its roadmap such that, in the midst of the Cyclone Nargis, that made 2.3 million people homeless, 130,000 killed and missing, it forced a fake and unilateral referendum on a military-backed Constitution that made permanent the participation of the unelected military in parliament and did not allow for amendments to the Charter by the people through its representatives.
Mechanisms in the ASEAN Charter to address violations committed by its members through its decision-making processes and dispute settlement measures are found to be sorely weak and wanting. Article 20, Chapter VII, is supposed to address recalcitrant members through the process of decisionmaking. Should there be no consensus, which prevails as the process of arriving at decisions at the lower level, the matter is raised up to the ASEAN Summit and this process ends there. Article 20 does not allow for a time period, much less a mechanism where the Summit can decisively act on a matter of crucial importance such as a charge of a government committing crimes against humanity. No wonder the Military Junta was among the first to ratify the Charter, even with the absence of parliament mandated to ratify the ASEAN instrument.
Chapter VIII on Dispute Settlement provides for mechanisms of dialogue and arbitration. Should non-compliance by a recalcitrant state prevail, the Secretary General can refer the matter to the Summit for decision. How, when, such decision is made to make it effective and enforceable is however, not spelled out. In brief, the Charter appears to merely extend the policies of consensus and non-interference in more diplomatic language. No wonder the Junta of Burma is not threatened. There is not enough collective teeth to discipline it into compliance.Its latest “democratic” act has been to incarcerate Suu Kyi after finishing her term of arrest, contrary to international pressure and internal protest. So, with the ASEAN Charter, its member states can commit murder with impunity.
Our position remains the same.
Hold ratification of the ASEAN Charter until the following are addressed: Release Aung Sang Suu Kyi and all political prisoners. Involve all stakeholders in a genuine roadmap to making a Constitution that is truly participated in by the people. Any talk of the 2010 elections without these requisites is a mockery of the people’s rights to democratic rule and social justice.
I end with this statement. Aung Sang Suu Kyi is now on hunger strike since 16 August 2008. The Military Junta denies this. We must act quickly and get ASEAN to intervene and talk to Suu Kyi through its Sec-Gen, Surin Pitsuwan. Anything less is hypocrisy.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES
Chair Emeritus, AKBAYAN
Co-Chair, PCICC
